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Abstract
We present a view of cooperative control using the language of learning in games. We review the
game theoretic concepts of potential games and weakly acyclic games and demonstrate how several co-
operative control problems such as consensus and dynamic sensor coverage can be formulated in these
settings. Motivated by this connection, we build upon game theoretic concepts to better accommodate
a broader class of cooperative control problems. In particular, we extend existing learning algorithms
to accommodate (i) restricted action sets caused by limitations in agent capabilities and (ii) group based
decision making. Furthermore, we also introduce a new class of games, called sometimes weakly acyclic
games, for time-varying objective functions and action sets, and provide distributed algorithms for con-
vergence to an equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The goals of this paper are twofold. First is to establish a relationship between cooperative control problems
and game theoretic methods, and to demonstrate the effectiveness of utilizing game theoretic approaches
for controlling multi-agent systems. Second, motivated by this connection, is to build upon existing game
theoretic results to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative control problems.
The results presented here are of independent interest in terms of their applicability to a large class of
games. However, we will use the consensus problem as the main illustration of the approach. In a discrete
time version of the consensus problem, initiated in [1], a group of players (or agents) P = fP1;:::;Png
seek to come to an agreement, or consensus, upon a common scalar value1 by repeatedly interacting with
one another. By reaching consensus, we mean converging to the agreement space characterized by
a1 = a2 =  = an;
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1The forthcoming results will hold for multi-dimensional consensus as well.
1where ai is referred to as the state of player Pi. Several papers study different interaction models and analyze
the conditions that lead to consensus [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
A well studied protocol, referred to here as the “consensus algorithm”, can be described as follows. At
each time step t 2 f0;1;:::g, each player Pi is allowed to interact with a group of other players, who are
referred to as the neighbors of player Pi and denoted as Ni(t). During an interaction, each player Pi is
informed of the current (or possibly delayed) state of all its neighbors. Player Pi then updates its state by
forming a convex combination of its state along with the state of all its neighbors. The consensus algorithm
takes on the general form
ai(t + 1) =
X
Pj2Ni(t)
!ij(t)aj(t); (1)
where !ij(t) is the relative weight that player Pi places on the state of player Pj at time t. The interaction
topology is described in terms of a time varying directed graph G(V;E(t)) with the set of nodes V = P
and the set of edges E(t)  P  P at time t. The set of edges is induced by the neighbor sets as follows:
(Pi;Pj) 2 E(t) if and only if Pj 2 Ni(t). We will refer to G(V;E(t)) as the interaction graph at time t.
There has been extensive research centered on understanding the conditions necessary for guaranteeing
the convergence of all states, i.e. limt!1 ai(t) ! a, for all players Pi 2 P. The convergence properties
of the consensus algorithm have been studied under several interaction models encompassing delays in
information exchange, connectivity issues, varying topologies and noisy measurements.
Surprisingly, there has been relatively little research that links cooperative control problems to a branch
of the learning in games literature [10] that emphasizes coordination games. The goal of this paper is to
better establish this link and to develop new algorithms for broader classes of cooperative control problems
as well as games.
In Section 2 we establish a connection between cooperative control problems and a particular class of
games known as “potential games”, and we model the consensus problem as a potential game. In Section 3,
we introduce a learning algorithm for potential games with state dependent action sets. We show that the
algorithm, when applied to the consensus problem, guarantees that players will come to a consensus even
in an environment ﬁlled with non-convex obstructions. In Section 4 we introduce a new class of games
called sometimes weakly acyclic games, which generalize potential games, and present simple learning
2dynamics with desirable convergence properties. We go on to illustrate these methods on the consensus
problem modeled as a sometimes weakly acyclic game. In Section 5 we develop learning algorithms that
can accommodate group based decisions. In Section 6 we illustrate the connection between cooperative
control and potential games on three separate problems including functional consensus, sensor deployment,
and sensor coverage. Section 7 presents some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Cooperative Control Problems and Potential Games
Cooperative control problems entail several autonomous players seeking to collectively accomplish a global
objective. The consensus problem is one example of a cooperative control problem, where the global objec-
tive is for all players to reach consensus upon a given state. The challenge in cooperative control problems
is designing local control laws and/or local objective functions for each of the individual players so that
collectively they accomplish the desired global objective.
One approach for cooperative control problems is to assign each individual player a ﬁxed protocol or
policy. This protocol speciﬁes precisely what each player should do under any environmental condition.
The consensus algorithm set forth in (1) is an example of such a policy based approach. A challenge in this
approach is to incorporate dynamic or evolving constraints on player policies. For example, suppose a global
planner desires a group of autonomous agents to physically converge to a central location in an environment
containing obstructions. The standard consensus algorithm may not be applicable to this problem since
limitations in control capabilities caused by environmental obstructions are not considered. Variations of
the consensus algorithm could possibly be designed to accommodate obstructions, but the analysis and
control design would be more challenging.
An alternative game theoretic approach to cooperative control problems, and our main interest in this
paper, is to assign each individual player a local objective function. In this setting, each player Pi 2 P is
assigned an action set Ai and a local objective function Ui : A ! R, where A =
Q
Pi2P Ai is the set of
joint actions. Provided that the assigned utility functions fall under a suitable category of games, one can
appeal to algorithms with guaranteed properties for all games within this category. In terms of the previous
discussion, we will see that consensus, with or without obstacles, falls under the same category of games.
3Thechallengeofcontroldesigninthegametheoreticapproachliesinbothdesigningtheplayerobjective
functions and learning dynamics so that players collectively accomplish the objective of the global planner.
Learningdynamicswillbeformulatedasarepeatedgame, inwhichaonestagegameisrepeatedateachtime
step t 2 f0;1;2;:::g. At every time step t > 0, each player Pi 2 P selects an action ai 2 Ai according to
a prescribed learning rule that speciﬁes how the player processes past observations from the interactions at
times f0;1;:::;t 1g to select an action at time t. The learning dynamics that will be used throughout this
paper are referred to as single stage memory dynamics which have a structural form similar to that of the
consensus algorithm; namely, the decision of any player Pi at time t is made using only observations from
the game played at time t   1. Of course, more general learning dynamics need not be restricted to single
stage memory.
2.1 Potential Games
Suppose that the objective of the global planner is captured by a potential function  : A ! R. We will
impose that each player’s objective function should be appropriately “aligned” with the objective of the
global planner. This notion of utility alignment (as presented in [11]) for multi-agent systems has a strong
connection to potential games [12].
Let
a i = (a1;:::;ai i;ai+1;:::;an)
denote the collection of actions of players other than player Pi. With this notation, we will frequently
express the joint action a as (ai;a i).
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Potential Games) PlayeractionsetsfAign
i=1 togetherwithplayerobjectivefunctionsfUi :
A ! Rgn
i=1 constitute a potential game if, for some potential function  : A ! R,
Ui(a00
i ;a i)   Ui(a0
i;a i) = (a00
i ;a i)   (a0
i;a i);
for every player Pi 2 P, for every a0
i;a00
i 2 Ai, and for every a i 2 j6=iAj.
A potential game, as deﬁned above, requires perfect alignment between the global objective and the
players’ local objective functions in the following sense. If a player unilaterally changed its action, the
4change in its objective function would be equal to the change in the potential function. There are weaker
notions of potential games, called weakly acyclic games, which will be discussed later.2 The connection
between cooperative control problems and potential games is important because learning algorithms for
potential games have been studied extensively in the game theory literature [13, 12, 14, 15, 16]. Accordingly,
if it is shown that a cooperative control problem can be formulated as a potential game, established learning
algorithms with guaranteed asymptotic results could be used to tackle the cooperative control problem at
hand.
Most of the learning algorithms for potential games guarantee convergence to a (pure) Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Nash Equilibrium) An action proﬁle a 2 A is called a pure Nash equilibrium if for all
players Pi 2 P,
Ui(a
i;a
 i) = max
ai2Ai
Ui(ai;a
 i): (2)
It is easy to see that in potential games, any action proﬁle maximizing the potential function is a pure Nash
equilibrium. Hence every potential game possesses at least one such equilibrium. However, there may also
exist suboptimal pure Nash equilibria that do not maximize the potential function.
2.2 Consensus Modeled as a Potential Game
In this section we will illustrate these concepts by showing that the consensus problem can be modeled as
a potential game by deﬁning players’ utilities appropriately. First, we establish a global objective function
that captures the notion of consensus. Next, we show that local objective functions can be assigned to each
player so that the resulting game is in fact a potential game. The potential game formulation of the consensus
problem discussed in this section requires the interaction graph to be time-invariant and undirected. In
Section 4.4 we relax these requirements by formulating the consensus problem as a sometimes weakly
acyclic game.
Consider a consensus problem with n-player set P where each player Pi 2 P has a ﬁnite action set Ai.
A player’s action set could represent the ﬁnite set of locations that a player could select.
2We will omit mentioning other classes of potential games, such as generalized ordinal or weighted potential games, as they are
just special cases of weakly acyclic games.
5We will consider the following potential function for the consensus problem3
(a) :=  
X
Pi2P
X
Pj2Ni
kai   ajk
2
; (3)
where Ni  P is player Pi’s time-invariant neighbor set. In the case where the interaction graph induced
by the neighbor sets fNign
i=1 is connected4, the potential function above achieves the value of 0 if and only
if the action proﬁle a 2 A constitutes a consensus, i.e.,
(a) = 0 , a1 =  = an:
Thegoalistoassigneachplayeranobjectivefunctionthatitisperfectlyalignedwiththeglobalobjective
in (3). One approach would be to assign each player the following objective function:
Ui(a) = (a):
This assignment would require each player to observe the decision of all players in order to evaluate its
payoff for a particular action choice, which may be infeasible. An alternative approach would be to assign
each player an objective function that captures the player’s marginal contribution to the potential function.
For the consensus problem with an undirected interaction topology, this translates to each player being
assigned the objective function
Ui(ai;a i) =  
X
Pj2Ni
kai   ajk: (4)
Now, each player’s objective function is only dependent on the actions of its neighbors. An objective func-
tion of this form is referred to as wonderful life utility (WLU); see [17, 11]. It is known that assigning each
agent a WLU leads to a potential game [17, 11]; however, we will explicitly show this for the consensus
problem in the following claim.
Claim 2.1 Players’ objective functions (4) constitute a potential game with the potential function (3) pro-
vided that the time-invariant interaction graph induced by the neighbor sets fNign
i=1 is undirected, i.e.,
Pj 2 Ni , Pi 2 Nj:
3This discussion uses a norm as a distance measure. Since we are dealing with ﬁnite actions sets, the norm kai   ajk, could be
replaced with a more general symmetric distance function (ai;aj), i.e., i) (ai;aj) > 0 , ai 6= aj, ii) (ai;aj) = 0 , ai = aj,
and iii) (ai;aj) = (aj;ai) for all ai;aj.
4A graph is connected if there exists a path from any node to any other node.
6Proof: Since the interaction graph is time-invariant and undirected, the potential function can be expressed
as
(a) =  
X
Pj2Ni
kai   ajk  
X
Pj6=Pi
X
Pk2NjnPi
kaj   akk
2
:
The change in the objective function of player Pi by switching from action a1
i to action a2
i provided that all
other players collectively play a i is
Ui(a2
i;a i)   Ui(a1
i;a i) =
X
Pj2Ni
 ka2
i   ajk + ka1
i   ajk;
= (a2
i;a i)   (a1
i;a i):
2
Note that the above claim does not require the interaction graph to be connected. There may exist other
potential functions and subsequent player objective functions that can accommodate more general setups.
For a detailed discussion on possible player objective functions derived from a given potential function, see
[17].
It is straightforward to see that any consensus point is a Nash equilibrium of the game characterized by
the player objective functions (4). This is because a consensus point maximizes the potential function as
well as the player objective functions (4). However, the converse statement is not true. Let A denote the set
of Nash equilibria and Ac denote the set of consensus points. We know that Ac  A where the inclusion
can be proper. In other words, a Nash equilibrium, say a 2 A, can be suboptimal, i.e., (a) < 0, and
hence fail to be a consensus point.
With the consensus problem now formulated as a potential game, there are a large number of learning
algorithms available with guaranteed results [10, 18, 17, 12, 15, 16]. Most of the learning algorithms for
potential games guarantee that the player behavior converges to a (possibly suboptimal) Nash equilibrium.
In the ensuing section, we will focus on a particular learning algorithm for potential games that guarantees
probabilistic convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium that maximizes the potential function.
73 Potential Games with State Dependent Action Sets
In this section, we analyze potential games with state dependent action sets. We will consider the special
case where the set of actions available for a given player depends on the player’s previous action.5 We
will refer to state dependent action sets of this form as (range) restricted action sets. We present a learning
algorithmforthisclassofgamesanddemonstratethatwhenappliedtotheconsensusproblem, thisalgorithm
guarantees consensus even in an environment containing arbitrary obstructions.
3.1 Background: Spatial Adaptive Play
Before stating the learning algorithm, we start with some notation. Let the strategy of player Pi at time
t be denoted by the probability distribution pi(t) 2 (Ai) where (Ai) denotes the set of probability
distributions over the set Ai. Using this strategy, player Pi randomly selects an action from Ai at time t
according to pi(t).
Consider the following learning algorithm known as spatial adaptive play (SAP) [20, 21, 10]. At each
time t > 0, one player Pi 2 P is randomly chosen (with equal probability for each player) and allowed
to update its action. All other players must repeat their actions, i.e. a i(t) = a i(t   1). At time t, the
updating player Pi randomly selects an action from Ai according to its strategy pi(t) 2 (Ai) where the
ai th component p
ai
i (t) of its strategy is given as
p
ai
i (t) =
expf Ui(ai;a i(t   1))g
P
 ai2Ai expf Ui( ai;a i(t   1))g
;
for some exploration parameter   0. The constant  determines how likely player Pi is to select a
suboptimal action. If  = 0, player Pi will select any action ai 2 Ai with equal probability. As  ! 1,
player Pi will select an action from its best response set
fai 2 Ai : Ui(ai;a i(t   1)) = max
a0
i2Ai
Ui(a0
i;a i(t   1))g
with arbitrarily high probability.
5We note that this scenario could have been formulated as a stochastic game [19] where the state is deﬁned as the previous
action proﬁle and the state dependent action sets are deﬁned accordingly. We will avoid formally deﬁning the game as a stochastic
game in favor of a direct presentation.
8In a repeated potential game in which all players adhere to SAP, the stationary distribution  2 (A)
of the joint action proﬁles is given in [20] as
(a) =
expf (a)g
P
 a2A expf ( a)g
:
One can interpret the stationary distribution  as follows: for sufﬁciently large times t > 0; (a) equals
the probability that a(t) = a. As  " 1, all the weight of the stationary distribution  is on the joint
actions that maximize the potential function. In the potential game formulation of the consensus problem,
the joint actions that maximize the potential function (3) are precisely the consensus points provided that
the interaction graph is connected. Therefore, if all players update their actions using the learning algorithm
SAP with sufﬁciently large , then the players will reach a consensus asymptotically with arbitrarily high
probability.
3.2 A Learning Algorithm for Potential Games with Suboptimal Nash Equilibria and Re-
stricted Action Sets
One issue with the applicability of the learning algorithm SAP for the consensus problem is that it permits
any player to select any action in its action set. Because of player mobility limitations, this may not be
possible. For example, a player may only be able to move to a position within a ﬁxed radius of its current
position. Therefore, we seek to modify SAP by conditioning a player’s action set on its previous action. Let
a(t   1) be the joint action at time t   1. With restricted action sets, the set of actions available to player
Pi at time t is a function of its action at time t   1 and will be denoted as Ri(ai(t   1))  Ai. We will
adopt the convention that ai 2 Ri(ai) for any action ai 2 Ai, i.e., a player is always allowed to stay with its
previous action.
We will introduce a variant of SAP called binary Restrictive Spatial Adaptive Play (RSAP) to accom-
modate the notion of restricted action sets. RSAP can be described as follows: At each time step t > 0,
one player Pi 2 P is randomly chosen (with equal probability for each player) and allowed to update its
action. All other players must repeat their actions, i.e. a i(t) = a i(t   1). At time t, the updating player
Pi selects one trial action ^ ai randomly from its allowable set Ri(ai(t   1)) with the following probability:
 Pr[^ ai = ai] = 1
zi for any ai 2 Ri(ai(t   1)) n ai(t   1),
9 Pr[^ ai = ai(t   1)] = 1  
jRi(ai(t 1))j 1
zi ,
where zi denotes the maximum number of actions in any restricted action set for player Pi, i.e., zi :=
maxai2Ai jRi(ai)j. After player Pi selects a trial action ^ ai, the player chooses its action at time t as follows:
Pr[ai(t) = ^ ai] =
expf Ui(^ ai;a i(t   1))g
expf Ui(^ ai;a i(t   1))g + expf Ui(a(t   1))g
;
Pr[ai(t) = ai(t   1)] =
expf Ui(a(t   1))g
expf Ui(^ ai;a i(t   1))g + expf Ui(a(t   1))g
;
where  0isanexplorationparameter. Notethatif ^ ai isselectedasai(t 1)thenPr[ai(t) = ai(t   1)] =
1.
We make the following assumptions regarding the restricted action sets.
Assumption 3.1 (Reversibility) For any player Pi 2 P and any action pair a1
i;a2
i 2 Ai,
a2
i 2 Ri(a1
i) , a1
i 2 Ri(a2
i):
Assumption 3.2 (Feasibility) For any player Pi 2 P and any action pair a0
i;am
i 2 Ai, there exists a
sequence of actions a0
i ! a1
i !  ! am
i satisfying ak
i 2 Ri(ak 1
i ) for all k 2 f1;2;:::;mg.
Theorem 3.1 Consider a ﬁnite n-player potential game with potential function (). If the restricted action
sets satisfy Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, then RSAP induces a Markov process over the state space A where the
unique stationary distribution  2 (A) is
(a) =
expf (a)g
P
 a2A expf ( a)g
; for any a 2 A: (5)
Proof: The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 6.2 in [10]. By Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2
we know that the Markov process induced by RSAP is irreducible and aperiodic; therefore, the process has
a unique stationary distribution. Below, we show that this unique distribution must be (5) by verifying that
the distribution (5) satisﬁes the detailed balanced equations
(a)Pab = (b)Pba;
for any a;b 2 A, where
Pab := Pr[a(t) = bja(t   1) = a]:
10Note that the only nontrivial case is the one where a and b differ by exactly one player Pi, that is, a i = b i
but ai 6= bi where ai 2 Ri(bi) which also implies that bi 2 Ri(ai). Since player Pi has probability 1=n of
being chosen in any given period and any trial action bi 2 Ri(ai), bi 6= ai, has probability of 1=zi of being
chosen, it follows that
(a)Pab =

expf (a)g
P
z2A expf (z)g



(1=n)(1=zi)
expf Ui(b)g
expf Ui(a)g + expf Ui(b)g

:
Letting
 =

1
P
z2A expf (z)g



(1=n)(1=zi)
expf Ui(a)g + expf Ui(b)g

;
we obtain
(a)Pab = expf(a) + Ui(b)g:
Since Ui(b)   Ui(a) = (b)   (a), we have
(a)Pab = expf(b) + Ui(a)g;
which leads us to
(a)Pab = (b)Pba:
2
Note that if all players adhere to the learning dynamics RSAP in a consensus problem where the inter-
action graph is time-invariant and undirected, the restricted action sets satisfy Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, and
players are assigned the utilities (4), then, at sufﬁciently large times t, the players’ collective behavior will
maximizethepotentialfunction(3)witharbitrarilyhighprobabilityprovidedthat issufﬁcientlylarge. Fur-
thermore, if the interaction graph is connected and consensus is possible, meaning (A1\A2\\An) 6= ;,
then, at sufﬁciently large times t > 0, the players’ actions will constitute a consensus with arbitrarily high
probability even in an environment ﬁlled with non-convex obstructions.
3.3 Example: Consensus in an Environment with Arbitrary Obstructions
Consider the 2-D consensus problem with player set P = fP1;P2;P3;P4g. Each player Pi has an action
set Ai = f1;2;:::;10gf1;2;::;10g as illustrated in Figure 1. The arrows represent the time-invariant and
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Figure 1: Consensus Problem with Restricted Action Sets and Arbitrary (Non-Convex) Obstructions.
undirected edges of the connected interaction graph. The restricted action sets are highlighted for players P2
and P4. At any given time, any player can have at most 9 possible actions; therefore, zi = 9 for all players
Pi 2 P. The action sets are further restricted by the given obstruction.
We simulated RSAP on the consensus problem with the interaction graph, environmental obstruction,
and the initial conditions shown in Figure 1. The simulations reﬂect an increasing exploration parameter
 = t=200 during player interactions. The complete action path of all players reaching a consensus is shown
in Figure 1.
4 Weakly Acyclic and Sometimes Weakly Acyclic Games
In potential games, players’ objective functions must be perfectly aligned with the potential of the game.
In the potential game formulation of the consensus problem, this alignment condition required that the
interaction graph be time-invariant and undirected. In this section we will seek to relax this alignment
requirement by allowing player objective functions to be “somewhat” aligned with the potential of the game.
We will review a weaker form of potential games called weakly acyclic games and introduce a new class of
gamescalledsometimesweaklyacyclicgames. Wewillalsopresentsimplelearningdynamicsthatguarantee
convergence to an invariant Nash equilibrium, to be deﬁned later, in any sometimes weakly acyclic game.
124.1 Weakly Acyclic Games
Consider any ﬁnite game G with player set P, action set A, and utility functions fUign
i=1. A better reply
path is a sequence of action proﬁles a1;a2;:::;aL such that, for every 1  `  L   1, there is exactly one
player Pi` such that i) a`
i` 6= a`+1
i` , ii) a`
 i` = a`+1
 i` , and iii) Ui`(a`) < Ui`(a`+1). In other words, one player
moves at a time, and each time a player moves it increases its own utility.
Suppose now that G is a potential game with potential function . Starting from an arbitrary action
proﬁle a 2 A, construct a better reply path a = a1;a2;:::;aL until it can no longer be extended. Note ﬁrst
that such a path cannot cycle back on itself, because  is strictly increasing along the path. Since A is ﬁnite,
the path cannot be extended indeﬁnitely. Hence, the last element in a maximal better reply path from any
joint action, a, must be a Nash equilibrium of G.
This idea may be generalized as follows. The game G is weakly acyclic if for any a 2 A, there exists a
better reply path starting at a and ending at some pure Nash equilibrium of G [10, 18]. Potential games are
special cases of weakly acyclic games.
The above deﬁnition does not clearly identify the similarities between potential games and weakly
acyclic games. Furthermore, using this deﬁnition to show that a given game G (i.e., the players, objective
functions, and action sets) is weakly acyclic can be problematic in that being weakly acyclic is a path-
wise, rather than pointwise, property of the joint actions. With these issues in mind, we will now derive an
equivalent deﬁnition for weakly acyclic games that utilizes potential functions.
Proposition 4.1 A game is weakly acyclic if and only if there exists a potential function  : A ! R such
that for any action a 2 A that is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player Pi 2 P with an action a0
i 2 Ai
such that Ui(a0
i;a i) > Ui(ai;a i) and (a0
i;a i) > (ai;a i).
Proof: (() Select any action a0 2 A. If a0 is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player Pi 2 P with an
action a0
i 2 Ai such that Ui(a1) > Ui(a0) and (a1) > (a0) where a1 = (a0
i;a0
 i).
Repeat this process and construct a path a0;a1;:::;an until it can no longer be extended. Note ﬁrst that
such a path cannot cycle back on itself, because  is strictly increasing along the path. Since A is ﬁnite, the
path cannot be extended indeﬁnitely. Hence, the last element in this path must be a Nash equilibrium.
13()) We will construct a potential function  : A ! R recursively. Select any action a0 2 A. Since
the game is weakly acyclic, there exists a better reply path a0;a1;:::;an where an is a Nash equilibrium.
Let A0 = fa0;a1;:::;ang. Deﬁne the (ﬁnite) potential function  over the set A0 satisfying the following
conditions:
(a0) < (a1) <  < (an):
Now select any action ~ a0 2 A n A0. There exists a better reply path ~ a0;~ a1;:::;~ am where ~ am is a Nash
equilibrium. Let A1 = f~ a0;~ a1;:::;~ amg. If A1 \ A0 = ; then deﬁne the potential function  over the set
A1 satisfying the following conditions:
(~ a0) < (~ a1) <  < (~ am):
If A1 \ A0 6= ;, then let k0 = minfk 2 f1;2;:::;mg : ~ ak 2 A0g. Deﬁne the potential function  over the
truncated (redeﬁned) set A1 = f~ a0;~ a1;:::;~ ak0 1g satisfying the following conditions:
(~ a0) < (~ a1) <  < (~ ak0
):
Now select any action ^ a0 2 A n (A0 [ A1) and repeat until no such action exists.
The construction of the potential function  guarantees that for any action a 2 A that is not a Nash
equilibrium, there exists a player Pi 2 P with an action a0
i 2 Ai such that Ui(a0
i;a i) > Ui(ai;a i) and
(a0
i;a i) > (ai;a i).
2
As with potential games, there are several learning algorithms with guaranteed results available for
weakly acyclic games [18, 22, 15]. There are both advantages and disadvantages to formulating a coopera-
tive control problem as a weakly acyclic game as opposed to a potential game. One advantage is ﬂexibility
in designing players’ objective functions. In potential games, players’ objective functions must be perfectly
aligned with the potential function. In contrast to potential games, weakly acyclic games only require that at
least one player’s objective function is aligned with the potential function for any action proﬁle. This ﬂex-
ibility in designing objective functions could be exploited in several ways to design more desirable control
architectures for distributed systems. One example of this involves relaxing the structural requirements on
player objective functions, such as system requirements, e.g. an invariant interaction graph, or minimizing
14the degree to which a player’s objective function depends on the actions of other players. An alternative
example involves equilibrium manipulation, i.e., designing objective functions such that all pure Nash equi-
librium are desirable.
When looking at the consensus problem, the potential game formulation required the interaction topol-
ogy to be undirected as the following example illustrates.
Consider a consensus problem with three players P1;P2; and P3 with the following neighbor sets N1 =
fP1;P2g;N2 = fP2;P3g, and N3 = fP3;P1g: Suppose the action set of each player Pi is Ai = fa;bg for
some a;b 2 R. Consider the following better reply path where the (top,middle,bottom) action is the action
of player (P1,P2,P3) respectively.
2
4
a
b
a
3
5
!
2
4
b
b
a
3
5 !
2
4
b
a
a
3
5
!
2
4
b
a
b
3
5
!
2
4
a
a
b
3
5 !
2
4
a
b
b
3
5
!
2
4
a
b
a
3
5: (6)
If this were a potential game, then each deviation would also increase the potential function. However, this
is not possible because there exists a better reply cycle.
This requirement on the interaction graph is no longer necessary when formulating the consensus prob-
lem as a weakly acyclic game. For example, it is easy to see that the example in (eq:consensus-not-potential)
is a weakly acyclic game because there exists a better reply path from any action proﬁle to a Nash equilib-
rium (or in this case, a consensus point).
A disadvantage of weakly acyclic games when compared to potential games as a paradigm for designing
distributed systems is the lack of a systematic procedure for utilizing this ﬂexibility in designing players’
objective functions from a given global objective. For example, there are several systematic procedures
for designing players’ objective functions such that the resulting game is a potential game [17]. One such
example is the Wonderful Life Utility discussed earlier. An open research question is understanding whether
suchaprocedureforweaklyacyclicgamescanbeobtainedandquantifyingthepossiblegainsbyconsidering
weakly acyclic games over potential games.
To avoid redundancy, we will omit explicitly modeling a general consensus problem with a time-
invariant directed interaction topology as a weakly acyclic game. Rather, in Section 4.4 we will model the
more general consensus problem with a time varying directed interaction topology as a sometimes weakly
acyclic game.
154.2 Sometimes Weakly Acyclic Games
In this section, we will extend the notion of weakly acyclic games to include state dependent objective
functions. This framework is known as a Markov, or stochastic game [19].
In the potential game formulation of the consensus problem, each player was assigned a time-invariant
objective function of the form (4). However, in the case of a time-varying interaction topology, we would
liketoallowplayerobjectivefunctionstobetime-varying. Inthisframework, eachplayerPi isnowassigned
a local state-dependent objective function Ui : A  X ! R where X is the set of states. In the consensus
problem, X could represent the set of possible interaction topologies. Denote the objective function of
player Pi at time t as Ui(a(t);x(t)) where a(t) and x(t) are the action proﬁle and state at time t. The state
dynamics take on the general form
x(t) = f(x(t   1);a(t   1);N(t));
where N(t) is nature’s inﬂuence at time t.6
An action proﬁle a is an invariant Nash equilibrium if
Ui(a;x) = max
ai2Ai
Ui((ai;a
 i);x); 8x 2 X:
A game is sometimes weakly acyclic if there exists a potential function  : A ! R and a ﬁnite time
constant T such that the following property holds: for any time t0 > 0, if a(t0) = a0 is not an invariant
Nash equilibrium, then there exists a player Pi 2 P, an action a0
i 2 Ai, and a time t 2 [t0;t0 + T] where
Ui((a0
i;a0
 i);x(t)) > Ui(a0;x(t)) and (a0
i;a0
 i) > (a0) provided that a(t0) = a(t0+1) = ::: = a(t 1).
Note that the sometimes weakly acyclic property depends on the objective functions, state dynamics, and
nature’s inﬂuence.
Note that a sometimes weakly acyclic game has at least one invariant Nash equilibrium: namely, any
action proﬁle that maximizes the potential function .
4.3 Learning Dynamics for Sometimes Weakly Acyclic Games
We will consider the better reply with inertia dynamics for games involving state-dependent objective func-
tions. These dynamics are a slight extension of the ﬁnite memory and inertia dynamics in [18] to include
6For example, one can think of N(t) as time varying neighborhood sets in the consensus problem.
16state-dependent objective functions. Before stating the learning dynamics, we redeﬁne a player’s better
reply set for any action proﬁle a 2 A and state x 2 X as
Bi(a;x) := fa0
i 2 Ai : Ui((a0
i;a i);x) > Ui(a;x)g:
The better reply with inertia dynamics can be described as follows. At each time t > 0, each player Pi pre-
sumes that all other players will continue to play their previous actions a i(t 1). Under this presumption,
each player Pi 2 P selects an action according to the following strategy at time t:
Bi(a(t   1);x(t)) = ; ) ai(t) = ai(t   1);
Bi(a(t   1);x(t)) 6= ; )
(
Pr[ai(t) = ai(t   1)] = (t);
Pr[ai(t) = a0
i] =
(1 (t))
jBi(a(t 1);x(t))j;
for any action a0
i 2 Bi(a(t   1);x(t)) where (t) 2 (0;1) is the player’s inertia at time t. According to
these rules, player Pi will stay with the previous action ai(t   1) with probability (t) even when there
is a perceived opportunity for improvement. We make the following standing assumption on the players’
willingness to optimize.
Assumption 4.1 There exists constants  and   such that for all times t  0 and for all players Pi 2 P,
0 <  < i(t) <   < 1:
Theorem 4.1 Consider any n-player sometimes weakly acyclic game with ﬁnite action sets. If all players
adhere to the better reply with inertia dynamics satisfying Assumption 4.1, then the joint action proﬁles will
converge to an invariant Nash equilibrium almost surely.
Proof: Let  : A ! R and T be the potential function and time constant for the sometimes weakly
acyclic game. Let a(t0) = a0 be the action proﬁle and x(t0) be the state at time t0. If a0 is an invariant
Nash equilibrium, then a(t) = a0 for all times t  t0 and we are done. Otherwise, there exists a time
t1 2 [t0;t0 + T], a player Pi 2 P, and an action a0
i 2 Ai such that Ui(a0
i;a0
 i;x(t1)) > Ui(a0;x(t1)) and
(a0
i;a0
 i) > (a0) provided that a(t0) = a(t0 + 1) = ::: = a(t1   1). Because of players’ inertia, the
action a1 = (a0
i;a0
 i) will be played at time t1 with at least probability n 1 (1  )
jAj nT.
17One can repeat this argument to show that for any time t0 > 0 and any action proﬁle a(t0) there exists
an invariant Nash equilibrium a such that
Pr[a(t) = a;8t  t]  
where
t = t0 + T jAj;
 =

n 1(1    )
jAj
n T
jAj
:
2
4.4 Consensus Modeled as a Sometimes Weakly Acyclic Game
Two main drawbacks arose in the potential game formulation of the consensus problem. The ﬁrst problem
was that a Nash equilibrium was not necessarily a consensus point even when the interaction graph was
connected and the environment was obstruction free. Therefore, we needed to employ a stochastic learning
algorithm like SAP or RSAP to guarantee that the collective behavior of the players would be a consensus
point with arbitrarily high probability. SAP or RSAP led to consensus by introducing noise into the decision
making process, meaning that a player would occasionally make a suboptimal choice. The second problem
was that the interaction graph needed to be time-invariant, undirected, and connected in order to guarantee
consensus.
In this section, we will illustrate that by modeling the consensus problem as a sometimes weakly acyclic
game one can effectively alleviate both problems. For brevity, we will show that the 1-dimensional consen-
sus problem with appropriately designed player objective functions is a sometimes weakly acyclic game.
One can easily extend this to the multi-dimensional case.
4.4.1 Setup: Consensus Problem with a Time-Varying and Directed Interaction Graph
Consider a consensus problem with a n-player set P and a time-varying and directed interaction graph. Each
player has a ﬁnite action set Ai  R and without loss of generalities, we will assume that A1 = A2 =  =
18An. Each player Pi 2 P is assigned an objective function Ui : A  Xi ! R where the Xi is the set of
states for player Pi. We deﬁne the state of player Pi at time t as the tuple
xi(t) = fNi(t);ai(t   1)g; (7)
where Xi := 2P  Ai, X :=
Q
Pi Xi, and 2P denotes the power sets of P. We note that there are many
alternative possibilities for the state selection. For example, one could alternatively deﬁne the state of player
Pi at time t as
xi(t) = fNi(t);Ni(t   1);faj(t   1)gj2Ni(t);fa(t   2)gj2Ni(t 1)g:
This structure allows a player’s utility function to depend on information from the last two time periods.
Hence, a player’s utility function could be designed to depend on how players are changing as opposed to a
static view of the players’ actions, which is the structure of the consensus algorithm (1).
In this section we will focus on the 1-dimensional consensus problem with player states as deﬁned in
(7). and a disagreement function of the form
D(a;  P) := max
Pi;Pj2  P
(ai   aj) (8)
for some nonempty player set  P  P. We note that this measure could be generalized for larger dimen-
sional spaces; however, we will focus purely on the state deﬁnition (7) and the disagreement measure (8) to
highlight the connections between the consensus problem and sometimes weakly acyclic games.
Rather than specifying a particular objective functions as in (4), we will introduce a class of admissible
objective functions. An objective function for player Pi is called a reasonable objective function if, for any
action proﬁle a 2 A and state xi 2 Xi, the better response set satisﬁes the following two conditions:
Bi(a;xi)  fa0
i 2 Ai : D((a0
i;a i);Ni)  D(a;Ni)g; (9)
jfa0
i 2 Ai : D((a0
i;a i);Ni)  D(a;Ni)gj > 1 ) Bi(a;xi) 6= ;: (10)
Roughly speaking, these conditions ensure that a player will not value moving further away from its belief
about the location of its neighbors. An example of a reasonable objective function, is
Ui(a;fNi; aig) =  D(a;Ni)    Ifai =  aig; (11)
19where fNi; aig 2 Xi, Ifg is the usual indicator function, and  penalizes players for immobility. If  > 0
is sufﬁciently small, then it is easy to verify that (11) is a reasonable objective function (since the action sets
Ai are ﬁnite).
We will now relax our requirements on the connectivity and time-invariance of the interaction graph in
the consensus problem. A common assumption (e.g., [8]) on the interaction graph is connectedness over
intervals.
Assumption 4.2 (Connectedness Over Intervals) There exists a constant T > 0 such that for any time
t > 0, the interaction graph with nodes P and edges E = E(t) [  [ E(t + T) is connected.
Proposition 4.2 UnderAssumption4.2, reasonableobjectivefunctionssatisfying(9)–(10)constituteasome-
times weakly acyclic game. Furthermore, every invariant Nash equilibrium constitutes consensus.
Proof:
To prove that the game is sometimes weakly acyclic, we introduce the following potential function
 : A ! R which depends on the disagreement measure (8) and the number of players at the boundaries,
(a) =  D(a;P) + A

1  
 n(a)
n

; (12)
where
Pmin(a) := fPi 2 P : ai = min
j
ajg;
Pmax(a) := fPi 2 P : ai = max
j
ajg;
 n(a) := min(jPmin(a)j;jPmax(a)j);
A := minfjD(a1;P1)   D(a2;P2)j : a1;a2 2 A;P1;P2 2 2P;D(a1;P1) 6= D(a2;P2)g:
Note that the potential function is a non-positive function that achieves the value of 0 if and only if the
action proﬁle constitutes a consensus. Furthermore, note that the potential function is independent of the
interaction topology.7
7In the 1-dimensional consensus problem, there are two boundaries, i.e., the maximum and minimum value. In higher dimen-
sional spaces, one would need to be more careful with the deﬁnition of boundaries. However, the same structural form of the
potential function in (12) could be used to prove that higher dimensional consensus problems with appropriately deﬁned players’
objective functions constitute a sometimes weakly acyclic games.
20In order to show that the reasonable objective functions constitute a sometimes weakly acyclic game,
we need to show that (12) satisﬁes the conditions set forth in Section 4.2. It is easy to see that any consensus
point is an invariant Nash equilibrium. We will show that if an action proﬁle is not a consensus point, then
there exists a player who can increase its objective function as well as the potential function at some time in a
ﬁxed time window. This implies that every invariant Nash equilibrium is a consensus point and furthermore
that the game is sometimes weakly acyclic.
Let a0 = a(t0) be any joint action that is not a consensus point. We will show that for some time
t1 2 [t0;t0 + T] there exists a player Pi 2 P with an action a0
i 2 Ai such that Ui((a0
i;a0
 i);xi(t1)) >
Ui(a0;xi(t1)) and (a0
i;a0
 i) > (a0) provided that a(t0) = ::: = a(t1   1). To see this let P0(a0) be the
minimumboundaryplayerset, i.e., P0(a0) = Pmin(a0)ifjPmin(a0)j  jPmax(a0)jandP0(a0) = Pmax(a0)
otherwise. Since the interaction graph satisﬁes Assumption 4.28, for some t1 2 [t0;t0 + T] there exists at
least one player Pi 2 P0 with a neighbor Pj 2 Ni(t1) n P0. Therefore,
jBi(a0;fNi(t1);a0
ig)j 6= ;:
This is true because there exists at least two actions for player Pi that do not increase the disagreement
measure, namely a0
i trivially and also a0
j as D(a0
j;a0
 i)  D(a0).
Let a0
i 2 Bi(a0;xi(t1)), a0
i 6= a0
i, and for notional convenience let a1 = (a0
i;a0
 i). We know that
D(a1;P)  D(a0;P). If D(a1;P) < D(a0;P), then
(a1) =  D(a1;P) + A

1  
 n(a1)
n

;
>  D(a0;P) + A

1  
 n(a1)
n

+ A;
>  D(a0;P) + A

1  
 n(a0) + n
n

+ A;
= (a0):
8Note that assumption 4.2 is stronger than necessary for this proof.
21If D(a1;P) = D(a0;P), then
(a1) =  D(a0;P) + A

1  
 n(a1)
n

;
>  D(a0;P) + A

1  
 n(a1) + 1)
n

;
=  D(a0;P) + A

1  
 n(a0)
n

;
= (a0);
where the third equality comes from the fact that  n(a1) =  n(a0) 1. Therefore, a0 is not an invariant Nash
equilibrium, and the game is sometimes weakly acyclic. This completes the proof.
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Combining Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.1, we conclude that if all players adhere to the better reply
with inertia dynamics in a consensus problem where the interaction graph satisﬁes Assumption 4.2 and the
players are assigned reasonable objective functions then the joint action proﬁle will converge almost surely
to a consensus point.
This section illustrates the main advantages of designing objective function and state dynamics within
the framework of sometimes weakly acyclic games . For the consensus problem, we reduced the structural
requirement on players objective function, thereby allowing a time-varying directed interaction graph. Fur-
thermore, theaforementioneddesignensuredthatallinvariantNashequilibriaweredesirable, i.e., consensus
points. This did not hold in the potential game formulation.
5 Group Based Decision Processes for Potential Games
In this section, we analyze the situation where players are allowed to collaborate with a group of other
players when making a decision. In particular we extend SAP to accommodate such a grouping structure.
Our main motivation for considering group based decision processes is the possibility of coupled constraints
on players’ action sets.
5.1 Spatial Adaptive Play with Group Based Decisions
We consider a variation of the traditional non-cooperative games to include group based decisions. The
structure of these group based games is as follows: there exists a ﬁnite set of players P = (P1;:::;Pn),
22each player has a ﬁnite action set Ai, and each group or players G  P is assigned a group utility function
UG : A ! R. We will call such a game a group based potential game if there exists a potential function
 : A ! R such that for any group G  P, collective group actions a0
G;a00
G 2 AG :=
Q
Pi2G Ai, and
a G 2
Q
Pi= 2G Ai,
UG(a00
G;a G)   UG(a0
G;a G) = (a00
G;a G)   (a0
G;a G):
Notice that any group based potential game is also a potential game.
We will now introduce a variant of SAP to accommodate group based decisions. At each time t > 0, a
group of players G  P is randomly chosen according to a ﬁxed probability distribution q 2 (2P). We
will refer to qG as the probability that group G will be chosen. We make the following assumption on the
group probability distribution.
Assumption 5.1 (Completeness) For any player Pi 2 P there exists a group G  P such that Pi 2 G and
qG > 0.
Once a group is selected, the group is unilaterally allowed to alter its collective strategy. All players not in
the group must repeat their action, i.e., a G(t) = a G(t   1), where aG is the action-tuple of all players
in the group G, and a G is the action-tuple of all players not in the group G. At time t, the updating group
G randomly selects a collective action from AG according to the collective strategy pG(t) 2 (AG) where
the aG th component p
aG
G (t) of the collective strategy is deﬁned as
p
aG
G (t) =
expf UG(aG;a G(t   1))g
P
 aG2AG expf UG( aG;a G(t   1))g
;
for some exploration parameter   0.
We will now show that the convergence properties of the learning algorithm SAP still hold with group
based decisions.
Theorem 5.1 Consider a ﬁnite n-player group based potential game with potential function () and a
group probability distribution q satisfying Assumption 5.1. SAP with group based decisions induces a
Markov process over the state space A where the unique stationary distribution  2 (A) is
(a) =
expf (a)g
P
 a2A expf ( a)g
; for any a 2 A: (13)
23Proof: The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 6.2 in [10]. By Assumption 5.1, the
Markov process induced by SAP with group based decisions is irreducible and aperiodic; therefore, the
process has a unique stationary distribution. Below, we show that this unique distribution must be (15) by
verifying that the distribution (15) satisﬁes the detailed balanced equations
(a)Pab = (b)Pba;
for any a;b 2 A, where
Pab := Pr[a(t) = bja(t   1) = a]:
Note that there are now several ways to transition from a and b when incorporating group based decisions.
Let  G(a;b) represent the group of players with different actions in a and b, i.e.,
 G(a;b) := fPi 2 P : ai 6= big:
Let G(a;b)  2P be the complete set of player groups for which the transition from a to b is possible, i.e.,
G(a;b) := fG 2 2P :  G(a;b)  Gg:
Since a group G 2 G(a;b) has probability qG of being chosen in any given period, it follows that
(a)Pab =

expf (a)g
P
z2A expf (z)g


 X
G2G(a;b)
qG
expf UG(b)g
P
 aG2AG expf UG( aG;a G)g

:
Letting
G :=

1
P
z2A expf (z)g



qG P
 aG2AG expf UG( aG;a G)g

;
we obtain
(a)Pab =
X
G2G(a;b)
G expf(a) + UG(b)g:
Since UG(b)   UG(a) = (b)   (a) and G(a;b) = G(b;a), we have
(a)Pab =
X
G2G(b;a)
G expf(b) + UG(a)g;
which leads us to
(a)Pab = (b)Pba:
2
245.2 Coupled Constraints on Group Action Sets
In the previous section, the updating group employed a strategy with a probability distribution having full
support on the group action set AG =
Q
Pi2G Ai. In this section, we consider the situation where the actions
available to a given group are constrained, i.e., AG 
Q
Pi2G Ai.
In this setting, the updating group G randomly selects a collective action from AG according to the
collective strategy pG(t) 2 (AG) where for any action aG 2 AG,
p
aG
G (t) =
expf UG(aG;a G(t   1))g
P
 aG2AG expf UG( aG;a G(t   1))g
;
for some exploration parameter   0. Otherwise, for any action aG = 2 AG, p
aG
G (t) = 0.
These dynamics deﬁne a Markov process over a constrained state space  A  A that can be characterized
as follows. Let a(0) be the initial actions of all players. If  a 2  A then there exists a sequence of action
proﬁles a(0) = a0;a1;:::;an =  a with the condition that for all k 2 f1;2;:::;ng, ak = (ak
Gk;ak 1
 Gk) for
a group Gk  P, where qGk > 0 and ak
Gk 2 AGk. In words,  A is the recurrent class of reachable states
starting from a(0).
Theorem 5.2 Consider a ﬁnite n-player group based potential game with potential function () and a
group probability distribution q satisfying Assumption 5.1. SAP with group based decisions and constrained
group action sets fAGgGP induces a Markov process over the constrained state space  A  A. The unique
stationary distribution  2 (  A) is
(a) =
expf (a)g
P
 a2A expf ( a)g
; for any a 2  A: (14)
The proof of Theorem 5.1 also applies to Theorem 5.2.
5.3 Restricted Spatial Adaptive Play with Group Based Decisions
Extending these results to accommodate restricted action sets is straightforward. Let a(t   1) be the action
proﬁle at time t   1. At time t, the updating group G selects one trial action ^ aG randomly from the group’s
restricted action set RG(aG(t   1))  AG with the following probability:
 Pr[^ aG = aG] = 1
zG for any aG 2 RG(aG(t   1)) n aG(t   1),
25 Pr[^ aG = aG(t   1)] = 1  
jRG(aG(t 1))j 1
zG ,
where zG denotes the maximum number of actions in any restricted action set for group G, i.e., zG :=
maxaG2AG jRG(aG)j. After the group G selects a trial action ^ aG, the updating group G selects their action
aG(t) according to the collective strategy
Pr[aG(t) = ^ aG] =
expf UG(^ aG;a G(t   1))g
expf UG(^ aG;a G(t   1))g + expf UG(a(t   1))g
;
Pr[aG(t) = aG(t   1)] =
expf UG(a(t   1))g
expf UG(^ aG;a G(t   1))g + expf UG(a(t   1))g
;
where  0isanexplorationparameter. Notethatif ^ aG isselectedasaG(t 1)thenPr[aG(t) = aG(t   1)] =
1.
As before, these dynamics deﬁne a Markov process over a constrained state space  A  A, where  A
is the set of reachable states from a(0). Following the previous discussion, if  a 2  A then there exists a
sequence of action proﬁles a(0) = a0;a1;:::;an =  a with the condition that for all k 2 f1;2;:::;ng, ak =
(ak
Gk;ak 1
 Gk) for a group Gk  P, where qGk > 0 and ak
Gk 2 AGk. Furthermore, ak
Gk 2 RGk(ak 1
Gk )  AGk
for all k 2 f1;:::;ng.
We will state the following theorem without proof, since it follows from arguments similar to the proof
of Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.3 Consider a ﬁnite n-player group based potential game with potential function () and a
group probability distribution q satisfying Assumption 5.1. If the group restricted action sets are reversible
(i.e., satisﬁes Assumptions 3.1 for all groups), then RSAP with group based decisions and constrained group
action sets fAGgGP induces a Markov process over the constrained state space  A  A. The unique
stationary distribution  2 (  A) is
(a) =
expf (a)g
P
 a2  A expf ( a)g
; for any a 2  A: (15)
6 Illustrations
In this section we will illustrate the broad applicability of the theoretical results presented in this paper on
three separate problems: power management in sensor networks, dynamic sensor coverage, and functional
consensus.
266.1 The Sensor Deployment Problem
In this section, we consider the sensor deployment problem described in [23] and references therein. Con-
sider the problem of transferring data from immobile sources to immobile destinations through the use
of mobile intermediates nodes or relays. The deployment problem concerns positioning the intermediate
nodes so as to successfully transfer the data from the sources to destinations while optimizing some network
performance metric.
We will model the nodes, both immobile and mobile, as players fP1;:::;Png with ﬁnite action sets Ai
representing the set of physical locations that the node can reach. For example, in the case of an immobile
node, the action set is a singleton consisting of only the node’s ﬁxed location. We will assume that the
number of nodes and the information ﬂow is set a priori. The information ﬂow is determined by a ﬁxed
undirected graph G(V;E) with the set of nodes V = P and the set of edges E  P  P. The set of edges
deﬁnes the information ﬂow. We will adopt the notation that if information is passed from player Pi to
player Pj, then player Pj is in the neighbor set of player Pi, i.e., Pj 2 Ni.
A common metric used to assess the transmission cost between nodes is power. For a given allocation of
sensors (a1;:::;an), the power of transmitting information from sensor Pi to Pj typically takes on the form
e(ai;aj) = 1 + 2jjai   ajjj2;
where 1 and 2 are positive constants [23] [24]. A well studied performance objective is to ﬁnd a minimum
power deployment. That is, to ﬁnd an allocation (a
1;:::;a
n) 2 A that minimizes the total transmission
power used in the network
X
Pi2P
X
Pj2Ni
e(a
i;a
j):
This is equivalent to maximizing the performance metric  : A ! R where
(a) =  
X
Pi2P
X
Pj2Ni
jjai   ajjj2: (16)
At this stage, it is interesting to note that the potential function used in the consensus problem (3) is
equivalent (see footnote 3) to the potential function representing minimum power in the network (16). This
27implies that if each node is assigned a local utility function Ui : A ! R of the form
Ui(ai;a i) =  2
X
Pj2Ni
jjai   ajjj2; (17)
then we have an exact potential game with potential function (16). Therefore, if all agents update their
locations using SAP or RSAP (assuming restricted action sets), the stationary distribution of the process is
(a) =
expf(a)g
P
 a2A expf( a)g
; for any a 2 A:
As  " 1, all the weight of the stationary distribution is placed on action proﬁles which maximize the po-
tential function. In the problem of consensus, these action proﬁles represent consensus points. Alternatively,
in the problem of sensor deployment, these action proﬁles represent minimum power allocations.
For illustration purposes, we consider a sensor deployment problem with 17 nodes, 6 immobile and 11
mobile. We ﬁx the location of the 6 immobile nodes and the interaction graph as highlighted in Figure 2
and we randomly choose the starting locations of the remaining 11 mobile nodes. We consider the sensor
deployment problem in two settings. In the ﬁrst setting, suppose the power of a transmission is given by
e(ai;aj) = jjai   ajjj2:
We simulated the sensor deployment problem using RSAP with exploration parameter chosen as (t) = 1+
t=300. The ﬁnal conﬁguration of the sensors is given in Figure 2(a). The evolution of the total transmission
power in the network is shown in Figure 3. One can observe that an efﬁcient network is realized after
approximately 100 iterations.
It is well known that solving for the optimal node locations in such a setting is a convex optimization
problem. With that in my mind, we will make the problem more challenging (and non-convex) by adding
obstructions to the environment. Obstructions can be thought of as introducing variations in transmission
costs. In this setting, the transmission power takes on the form
e(ai;aj) =
(
jjai   ajjj2 if there is no obstruction in the transmission path,
1:3 jjai   ajjj2 if there is an obstruction in the transmission path.
One could imagine that an obstruction, such as bad terrain, could require additional transmission power.
We simulated this new sensor deployment problem using RSAP with exploration parameter chosen as
(t) = 1 + t=300. The environmental obstructions and the ﬁnal conﬁguration of the sensors is given in
28Figure 2(b). The evolution of the total power utilized in the network is shown in Figure 3. One can observe
that an efﬁcient network is realized after approximately 200 iterations. Furthermore, the environmental
obstructions did not impact the total transmission power signiﬁcantly as the intermediate nodes were able to
adjust their position to compensate for the obstructions.
Figure 2: Final Conﬁguration of Nodes in Environment with and without Obstructions
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Figure 3: Evolution of Transmission Power Utilized in Network
6.2 Dynamic Sensor Coverage Problem
In this section we will develop the dynamic sensor coverage problem described in [23] and references therein
to further illustrate the range applicability of the theory developed in this paper. The goal of the sensor
coverage problem is to allocate a ﬁxed number of sensors across a given “mission space” to maximize the
29probability of detecting a particular event.
We will divide the mission space into a ﬁnite set of sectors denoted as S. There exists an events density
function, or value function, V (s), deﬁned over S. We will assume that V (s)  0;8s 2 S and
P
s2S V (s) =
1. In the application of enemy submarine tracking, V (s) could be deﬁned as the a priori probability that an
enemy submarine is situated in sector s.
There are a ﬁnite number of autonomous sensors denoted as P = fP1;:::;Png allocated to the mission
space. Each sensor Pi can position itself in any particular sector, i.e., the action set of sensor Pi is Ai = S.
Furthermore, each sensor has limited sensing and moving capabilities. If an event occurs in sector s, the
probability of sensor Pi detecting the event given its current location ai is denoted as pi(s;ai). Typically,
each sensor has a ﬁnite sensing radius, ri, where the probability of detection obeys the following:
ks   aik < ri , pi(s;ai) > 0:
For a given joint action proﬁle a = fa1;:::;ang, the joint probability of detecting an event in sector s is
given by
P(s;a) = 1  
Y
Pi2P
[1   pi(s;ai)]:
In general, a global planner would like the sensors to allocate themselves in such a fashion as to maximize
the following potential function
(a) =
X
s2S
V (s)P(s;a):
We will assign each sensor a Wonderful Life Utility (WLU) [17, 11]. The utility of sensor Pi given any
action proﬁle a 2 A is now
Ui(a) = (ai;a i)   (a0
i;a i); (18)
where the action a0
i is deﬁned as the null action, which is equivalent to sensor Pi turning off all sensing
capabilities. The term (a0
i;a i) captures the value of the allocation of all sensors other than sensor Pi. In
this setting, a sensor can evaluate his utility using only local information. Furthermore, the resulting game
is a potential game with potential function ().
30In the following simulation we have the mission space and value function as illustrated in Figure 4. The
mission space is S = f1;2;:::;100g  f1;2;:::;100g and the value function satisﬁes
P
s2S V (s) = 1. We
have 18 different autonomous sensors, 6 with a sensing radius of 6, 6 with a sensing radius of 12, and 6 with
a sensing radius of 18. For simplicity, each sensor will have prefect sensing capabilities within its sensing
radius, namely for any sector s satisfying ks aik < ri, then pi(s;ai) = 1. Each sensor is endowed with the
WLU as expressed in (18). All 18 sensors originally started at the location (1;1) and each sensor has range
restricted action sets identical to that in the consensus problem illustrated in Figure 1. We ran the binary
RSAP with  = 0:6. Figure 4 illustrates a snapshot of the sensors conﬁguration at the ﬁnal iteration along
with the evolution of the potential function over the mission. The highlighted circles indicate the sensing
radii of the sensors.
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Figure 4: Sensor Coverage – Final Conﬁguration and Evolution of Potential Function over Mission
6.3 Functional Consensus
In the consensus problem, as described in Section 2.2, the global objective was for all agents to reach
consensus. In this section, we will analyze the functional consensus problem where the goal is for all
players to reach a speciﬁc consensus point which is typically dependent on the initial action of all players,
i.e.,
lim
t!1
ai(t) = f(a(0)); 8Pi 2 P;
31where a(0) 2 A is the initial action of all players and f : A ! R is the desired function. An example of
such a function for an n-player consensus problem is
f(a(0)) =
1
n
X
Pi2P
ai(0);
for which the goal would be for all players to agree upon the average of the initial actions of all players. We
will refer to this speciﬁc functional consensus problem as average consensus.
In order to achieve average consensus, the consensus algorithm of (1) requires that the interaction graph
is connected and the associated weighting matrix, 
 = f!ijgPi;Pj2P, is doubly stochastic [6]. A doubly
stochastic matrix is any matrix where all coefﬁcients are nonnegative and all column sums and rows sums
are equal to 1. The consensus algorithm takes on the following matrix form
a(t + 1) = 
 a(t):
If 
 is a doubly stochastic matrix, then for any time t > 0,
1Ta(t + 1) = 1T
 a(t) = 1Ta(t):
Therefore, the sum of the actions of all players is invariant. Hence, if the players achieve consensus, they
must agree upon the average.
The consensus algorithm imposes coupled constraints on players’ action sets by requiring the sum of
the actions of all players to be invariant. In this setting, if a player acted unilaterally and altered its action,
the invariance of the desired function would no longer be preserved. We will seek to replicate this approach
in a game theoretic setting by modeling the functional consensus problem as a group based potential game.
6.3.1 Setup: Functional Consensus Problem with Group Based Decisions
Consider the consensus problem with a time invariant undirected interaction graph as described in Sec-
tion 2.2. To apply the learning algorithm SAP or RSAP with group based decisions to the functional con-
sensus problem one needs to deﬁne both the group utility functions and the group selection process.
326.3.2 Group Utility Function
We will assign any group G  P the following local group utility function
UG(a) =  (1=2)
X
Pi2G
X
Pj2Ni\G
kai   ajk  
X
Pi2G
X
Pj2NinG
kai   ajk: (19)
It is straight forward to show that this group utility function design results in a group based potential game
with the potential function as in (3).
6.3.3 Group Selection Process and Action Constraints
Let a(t   1) be the action proﬁle at time t   1. At time t, one player Pi is randomly (uniformly) chosen.
Rather than updating its action unilaterally, player Pi ﬁrst selects a group of players G  P which we will
assume is the neighbors of player Pi, i.e., G = Ni. The group is assigned a group utility function as in (19)
and a constrained action set AG 
Q
Pi2G Ai.
A central question is how one can constrain the group action set, using only location information, such
as to preserve the invariance of the desired function f. In this case, we will restrict our attention only to
functions where “local” preservation equates to “global” preservation. This means that for each group G 
P there exists a function fG : AG ! R such that for any group actions a0
G;a00
G 2 AG and a G 2
Q
Pi= 2G Ai,
fG(a0
G) = fG(a00
G) ) f(a0
G;a G) = f(a00
G;a G):
Examples of functions that satisfy this constraint are
fG(a) =
1
jGj
X
Pi2G
ai ) f(a) =
1
jPj
X
Pi2P
ai;
fG(a) = max
Pi2G
ai ) f(a) = max
Pi2P
ai;
fG(a) = min
Pi2G
ai ) f(a) = min
Pi2P
ai:
In each of these examples, the structural form of f and fG is equivalent. There may exist alternative func-
tions where this is not required.
6.3.4 Illustration
We will illustrate this approach by solving the average consensus problem on the example developed in
Section 3.3. Given the initial conﬁguration, all players should agree upon the action (5;5). We will solve
33this average consensus problem using the learning algorithm binary RSAP with group based decisions where
the group restricted action set satisﬁes RG(aG) = AG \
 Q
Pi2G Ri(ai)

. However, we will omit the non-
convex obstruction in this illustration. This omission is not necessary, but convenient for not having to verify
that consensus is possible given the initial conditions and the constrained action sets.
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of each player’s actions using the stochastic learning algorithm binary
RSAP with group based decisions and an increasing  coefﬁcient, (t) = 1:5 + t(2=1000).
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Figure 5: Evolution of Each Player’s Action in the Average Consensus Problem
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a game theoretic approach to cooperative control by highlighting a connection between
cooperative control problems and potential games. We introduced a new class of games and enhanced
34existing learning algorithms to broaden the applicability of game theoretic methods in cooperative control
setting. We demonstrated that one could successfully implement game theoretic methods on the cooperative
control problem of consensus in a variety of settings. While the main example used was the consensus
problem, the results in Theorems 3.1, 4.1, and 5.1 and the notion of a sometimes weakly acyclic game is
applicable to a broader class of games as well as other cooperative control problems, such as the sensor
deployment problem or the dynamic sensor allocation problem.
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